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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\1 ( > LLERl.l, \TAN LIN I·:~, a corpor-
ntion. and LIBERT\T ~rurrl~AL IN-
Sl'lL\\(~E C<>~IP~\XY, a c.orporation, 
Plai11 f·if fs, 
vs. Case No. 
10101 
'l'liE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF rTAH, T\~\T11~N ADAM~, WA.- . 
~~\ TC II CONSTRUCTION ·COJ\{P ANY 
and TilE S T A T E INS$ANf0E 
Fl7XD~. Mt\; 
Defendants. 
n ~:· 
PLAINTIFFS' PEITITION FOR REHEARING 
~\Xl) BRIEF IN SUPPORT· THEREOF 
JOHN H. SNOW 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & WATKISS 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 0h; / · · , ·v ( 
Attorneys for Defendant Tyven Adams • : r . "' ' ' 
PHIL L. HAXSEX 
Attorney General, State of Utah 
CIL\RLES WELCH, JR. 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
\Yasatch Construction Company 
and The State Insurance Fund 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~l<lLLEH.l~P \rAN LINE.S, a corpor-
ation, and LIBERTY MUTUAL IN-
Sl'IL\~CE C():\IP.A~1T, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TilE TXD(TSTRIAL CO·MMISSIO·N 
()F l TT.AJT, rl1 \T\'" l 1~N ADAMS, WA-
~~\ TCll COX~rl1l{.L,.CTION ·COMPANY 
and THE S T .. \ T E INSURAN,CE 
FrXI1~, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
10101 
PL .. \IXTIFFS' PE·TITION FOR REHE·ARING 
~\XD BRIEF I~ SUPP'ORT· THEREOF· 
Plaintiffs petition the Court for rehearing and re-
arguiuent of the above case upon the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CON-
FLICT \YITH ITS DECISIONS OF 1962 AND EARLI-
ER CPO~ THE QUESTION OF WHICH EMPLOYER 
IS LIABLE FOR .AGGRAVATION OF A PREVIOUS 
IX JURY. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CON-
FLICT WITH ITS LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISION-
AL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO INVOKE 
CONTINUING JURISDICTION AND THE DECISION 
THUS CASTS DOUBT ON THE MEANING OF THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTE. 
WHEREFOR.E, plaintiffs pray that the judgment 
and opinion of the 'Court be recalled and a reargument 
be permitted upon the points herein set forth. 
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
JOHN H. SNOW 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
John H. Sno\\'" hereby certifies that he is attorney 
for plaintiffs, that there is good cause to believe the 
decision of the court is erroneous and that the case should 
he reheard and reargued, as prayed in said petition. 
DATE.D this lOth day of March, 1965. 
JOHN H. SNOW 
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BRIEF I~ SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CON-
FLICT WITH ITS DECISIONS OF 1962 AND EARLI-
ER UPON THE QUESTION OF WHICH EMPLOYER 
IS LIABLE FOR AGGRAVATION OF A PREVIOUS 
INJURY. 
Although each of the parties in this case suggested 
or urged, in printed briefs and upon oral argument, the 
applicability of the 1962 decision of this ·Court in Makoff 
Con1pany v. Industrial Co1nmission, 13 U. 2d 23, 368 
P.~d 70, the Court's opinion did not even mention tha.t 
d~ri~ion or the applicable principle for which it stands. 
That principle, so firmly established that this Court 
stated in 1929 it ""as "no longer an open question in this 
state'' (Gray bar Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
73lr. 5()S. :27() P. 161) has now been weakened, though per-
haps unintentionally, by the decision of the Court in the 
prPst\nt case. 
The J/akoff decision was but the latest in a long line 
of ease~ holding, so far as applicable here, that an aggra-
vation of a previous injury is compensable and that re-
g-ardlP~s of the identity of the employer at the tilne of 
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the first injury, the employer at the time of the aggra-
vation is the responsible employer. 
In the decision here under attack, the Court fastens 
liability upon the employer at the time of the first in-
jury, exonerates the employer at the time of the second 
of two aggravations and totally ignores the employer at 
the time of the first aggravation (Iverson), who had paid 
compensation to the applicant, through the State Insur-
ance Fund, for such first aggravation. 
A comparison between the facts of the present case 
and the facts of M akoff will demonstrate that the de-
cisions in the two cases are in direct conflict. 
In Makoff the applicant had been injured in 1955 
while employed by a stranger to the Makoff case. In 
1957, while working for ~Iakoff, he slipped on a stairway 
and sustained injury whirh the medical panel concluded 
"was an episode in a progressive back disorder." Later 
an incident occurred away from work at ,,,.hich time the 
1957 injury "ripened'' into a compensable disability. 
On these facts, this Court, speaking through Justice 
McDonough, stated: 
" ... under our aggravation cases "\Yhether he 
was employed by someone else in 1!155 "\Yould make 
no difference in result. The en1ployment by plain-
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tiffs (~la.koff) in 1957, "·hen his initial injury 
\\·a.H nggravatPd, iH of prilnary importance here." 
~lnkoff "·as held responsihlP for the eompensation due 
for thP diHahility. 
In thP presPnt case the applicant was injured while 
\\·orking for plaintiffs in 1958. (Plaintiffs therefore are 
in thP position of thP stranger in M akoff.) He was 
found hy the 1Comn1ission to have a 5% permanent disa-
bility for \Yhich he 'vas paid con1pensation by plaintiffs, 
pur~uant to the order of the ·Commision. In June, 1960, 
\vhile etnployed by Iverson he sustained a further injury 
to his baek and applied for compensation for the injuries 
thn~ sustained, and the State Insurance Fund paid bene-
fit~ as rotnpenRation for the IverRon injury. 
In 1962, \vhile e1nployed by Wasatch, he had a fur-
thf'r injury and the chairman of the medical panel, as 
\ra~ pointed out by the Court in its decision, stated that 
his haek "·as undergoing "a degenerative process that 
has been slowly progressing.'' This \vas just as the 
ll:tnel found in Jl ako.f_f. 
In the present case, as in ill nkoff, the subsequent 
epi~odes ag-g-ravated the condition "~hich had developed 
follo\\·in~ the first injury. As the chainnan of the medi-
cal panel te~tified (R. 105 ), each of the accidents sus-
taint·d hy the applicant cauRed a \vorsening of the pro-
.!!rt\~~ivP de~enerative proress. 
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As should be clear from the foregoing, Makoff, 
which was found liable, occupied the identical position 
as Wasatch occupies in the present case, or as Iverson 
would have occupied had he been brought into the case 
as a party, but at that point the similarity between the 
cases ends because the court found Makoff liable but no\r 
finds Wasatch not liable. 
It is submitted that if there are two applicants, each 
with a progressive degenerating process in the back \Yhich 
is injured and each suffers a subsequent injury which 
worsens the condition and the court in one case deter-
mines that the subsequent employer is liable, as it has 
always previously held, there can be neither reason, 
consistency, nor justice in a later holding, without explan-
ation, that the subsequent employer is not liable. 
If the present decision stands, there can be no mean-
ing to the proposition, often stated by this Court, that 
"no standard of health or physical fitness for an em-
ployment is prescribed by our statute to entitle an em-
ployee to compensation for an injury arising by accident 
out of or in the course of his employment. Apparently 
when one enters an employment, the employer takes the 
employee as he is." (Emphasis added.) Spencer v. In-
dustrial Commission (1935), 87 lT. 336, 40 P.2d 188. 
Any other polie:v would impose a heavy burden upon 
all '~first-injury employers," particularly where, as in 
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this rn~P, the injured employee ('vhose compensation case 
i=' thought to hP closPd) then ":orks for at least four 
~ub~PqUPnt entployPrs, sustains injuries while working 
for tw·o of the four, and a period of more than five 
yPar~ Plap~r~ het"·ppn the first injury and notice of 
hPn.ring on thP last injury. 
II Pre, during tnost of the period of more than five 
year~ aftPr the applicant's original injury, plaintiffs had 
no a~~oeiation "rith him, kne'v nothing of him, received 
no notieP about hitn and, of course, could make no in-
vt\~tigation concerning him. Neither could plaintiffs offer 
early 1nedical treatment which might have reduced the 
ulthnate disabili t~'". 
These facts demonstrate the wisdom of those previ-
ous decisions holding the subsequent employer, the "em-
ployer at aggravation," liable for aggravations of 
previous disabilities and holding that such subsequent 
employ(:\rs take he1nployees as they find them." 
Employees are not the only ones to be considered 
in cases arising under the Act. lT nder various sections 
of the .A .. ct, employers also have rights and these include, 
n~ this Court has said, the right to know the facts 
protnptly~ so there 'vill be the "opportunity of giving 
protnpt and proper medical aid" and the right to "pro-
t~rt ~nlployPr~ against fraudulent claims." Salt Lake 
City r. lndu:'trial Connnission, (1943), 104 U. 436, 140 
.P.2d t}-t-1-. 
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By use of this quotation, we do not mean to imply 
this claim is fraudulent. But, since decisions of this 
·Court govern all claims, whether litigated or not, its 
holdings should furnish guidelines as consistent as jus-
tice and the judicial process can produce. The decision 
in this case does not. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CON-
FLICT WITH ITS LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISION-
AL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO INVOKE 
·CONTINUIN·G JURISDICTION AND THE DECISION 
THUS CASTS DOUBT ON THE MEANING OF THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTE. 
The Commission's power of continuing jurisdiction 
is found in Section 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953. Heretofore, 
this ~Court has consistently held that the power "to make 
such modification or change 'vith respect to former find-
ings, or orders with respect thereto," as provided by 
the statute, cannot be exercised by the Commission \\rith-
out a sho,ving of ~'good cause," "Thich 1neans that there 
is "some change or neuJ development in the inj1Jry com-
plained of not kno"\\rn to the parties "Then thP formrr 
award is rnadP." Salt Lake City t,·. Tndustrial Connnission 
(1923), 61 lT. 514, 215 Jl. 10-t-7: Aetna Life l11s. Co. v. 
Tnrlnstr~ial Cnnnnissinn (1929), 73 TT. 366, 274 P. 139. 
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Contint'nlal Cas1H1lty Co. 'l'. Industrial Commission 
(1~)~7), 70 lT. 35-l, 260 P. 279: Carter v. Industrial Com-
·ntissiou (1930), 7() lT. ;)~(), 290 P. 776 (emphasis added). 
'ThP present decision appears, at first glance, to hold 
the sante but \vhen the facts of this case are examined, 
it is <'IPar the ~Court has approved a course of conduct 
hy the Commission that is at complete variance with the 
long--Pstablished standards governing the power of con-
tinning jurisdirtion. 
First, the applicant never had any intention of claim-
ing-, and does not no\v claim, there was a "change or new 
dPveloptnent'' in thP o rigi u n l injury. Thus, he made no 
attetnpt to sho\v "good cause'' and no notice of a claimed 
r~opening of his ease against plaintiffs was ever given, 
hPeause he did not RP~k it nor did his counsel. 
~eeond, the only parties clall:ning this "change 1n 
original injury" are those who "'ould escape their own 
rPspon~ibility by doing so - "\V-a.satch and the State 
1 nsuranee Fund. 
T1t i rd, PYen the Indu~trial Commission has not con-
tPnded it "·a~ reopening the former case. Just the oppo-
~ite i~ true, as is shown by Chairman Wiesley's statement 
(B. 1 ~~) : 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
"Now if an application was- on file within 
the three-year limit, then the applicant could re-
open that by filing an application for further and 
additional compensation, because of the continuing 
jurisdiction section of the statute. Which (sic) 
I can't consider this procedure as an application 
for further and additional compensation under 
that case." 
Fourth, the applicant's application was filed in Feb-
ruary, 1963 and notice of hearing was sent to plaintiffs 
in October, 1963, nearly eight months later, even though 
there had been proceedings in the meantime and even 
though nearly 11 months had elapsed since the Wasatch 
accident - 11 months of precious investigative time 
which was denied to plaintiffs. This never-to-be-regained 
investigative opportunity now looms particularly large 
since W asa.tch claims (as shown in its brief, p. 15) that 
the applicant "did not sustain an aecident" when he 
"Tas injured on its job. 
Fifth, the notice did not state "the objective of the 
proceedings," nor did it show ''the nature and character 
of the relief sought" or the party seeking it. 'These 
have been minimal due process requirements for more 
than -t-0 year~. Spring Canyon Coal ro. v. Industrial 
Comm,ission (1922), 60 l .... 533, 210 P. ()11. If this re-
quireinent had heen 1net, plaintiffs "Tould have had notice 
that their true antagonist 'Yas \\ ... asatch and they could 
have prepared their defense~ accordingly. 
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ThP~P practicPR and procPdures cannot be sustained 
hv 8tatutP or hv dPei~ional standards set by this Court 
. . 
~inre thP statutP \\·aH enacted, yet the present decision 
~PPtn~ to approve them and most certainly will be cited 
in thP future as doing so, if it is not recalled . 
. A dPcision which approves these methods and prac-
tieP~, \vhieh allo,vs subsequent employers to escape their 
obviou~ responsibility, which permits such employers to 
ntake un\\·itting etnployees mere pawns in a contest be-
h,·een en1ployers, is a decision which should not be al-
lo\Vflrl to Rtanrl. 
If these methods and practices of the 'Commision 
are not disapproved, what is to prevent the 'Commission 
frotn conducting similar proceedings in other cases of 
~urrPs~ivP injuries? This invites the very evil this ·c·ourt 
had in mind "·hen it said, in 1923, that permitting these 
pra('t irr~ H"·ould invite endless litigation in this class 
of ea.s(\~." j._~alt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 
{ 19~3) 61 tT. :l14, :215 P. 1047. 
This Court has always construed the vV orkmen's 
Cotnpensation Act liberally "with the purpose of ef-
fPrtuating its beneficent and humane objects." North 
Beck ]fining Co. v. Indu.strial Commission (1921), 58 U. 
486. 200 P. 111. It is, therefore, particularly ironic that 
this applicant, ""'ho has not once in this case sought re-
li~f against thPse plaintiffs, now finds himself, more than 
tw·o years after his application against Wasatch, still 
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awaiting surgery on his back. As he pointed out in his 
brief (P·. 5), Wasatch and the State Fund "are the ones 
who urged the Commission to relate this causal con-
nection back to the Mollerup employment injury in 1958." 
CON:CLUSION 
The decision creates unnecesary conflicts with earli-
er cases involving aggravation and approves practices 
and procedures which violate basic statutory and deci-
sional standards governing exercise of the power of con-
tinuing jurisdiction. 
Precedent need not be followed, merely for the sake 
of consistency, if it is concluded that the reason for the 
standards of the earlier cases is no longer valid. No such 
conclusion was announced by the Court in this decision 
and none can be inferred from the decision. 
The effects of this decision upon those who must 
conduct their affairs within the framework of the Act 
and its administration are widespread and deletorious. 
The ~c·ourt should recall the decision, order reargument 
of the case and, in such event, reverse the order of the 
Commission under appropriate instructions to prevent 
such occurrences in the future. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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